all-soc-level-12026.05.04
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haadi@portfolio:~$ cat windows-threat-detection-2.md

Room notes · SOC Level 1 · Windows security monitoring

Windows Threat Detection2

The first actions attackers take after breaching a Windows host: discovery, credential theft, data collection, and exfiltration: and how to detect each phase in Sysmon and Windows event logs.

What This Room Covers

The first actions attackers take after breaching a Windows host: discovery, credential theft, data collection, and exfiltration, and how to detect each phase in Sysmon and Windows event logs.


Key Concepts Learned

Post-Initial Access is where the real damage happens. Getting in is just the first step. An attacker's goal after initial access is to understand the environment (discovery), find credentials and sensitive data, collect it, and get it out. This room covers the entire sequence.

Discovery via native Windows tools, and why it's hard to detect The room opened with running net user Administrator: a completely legitimate command, and then finding it in Sysmon logs. This is the challenge: attackers use built-in Windows tools (net.exe, whoami, tasklist, ipconfig) that are also used by administrators. Detection requires context: who ran the command, from which parent process, at what time, in what sequence?

Malware Discovery Behavior in Sysmon The invoice.pdf.exe malware chain demonstrated the typical post-execution discovery sequence attackers automate:

  1. whoami: who am I running as?
  2. tasklist /v | findstr MsSense.exe: is MS Defender EDR running?
  3. Exfiltrate discovered system data to C2 domain

Checking for EDR before proceeding is a standard evasion technique: if EDR is detected, the malware may lie dormant or uninstall itself.

Credential and Data Theft: what attackers actually take The room examined what attackers target after getting in:

  • Saved browser passwords (Chrome Password Manager: plaintext accessible to the logged-in user)
  • SSH keys stored on disk
  • Internal documents (network diagrams, architecture docs, credentials files)

These are exactly the files APT36 and similar groups target in their operations against Pakistani organizations.

Data Stealer Malware in Sysmon The stealer created a staging directory, searched for specific file extensions (docx, pdf, xlsx), grabbed clipboard content, then exfiltrated to an S3 bucket. All of this is visible in Sysmon: directory creation, cmd.exe with search flags, PowerShell cmdlet execution, and DNS resolution for the exfil domain.

Living Off the Land Download Tools The room demonstrated four ways to download files in Windows without a browser: curl.exe, certutil.exe, PowerShell IWR (Invoke-WebRequest). Each is a legitimate Windows tool: each is also abused by attackers and malware for payload delivery. Detecting their use for downloading from external URLs is a high-value detection rule.


Hands-On Tasks

Investigated an active malware infection on a Windows VM: traced the invoice.pdf.exe execution chain through Sysmon, manually performed discovery commands to understand how they appear in logs, identified credentials and sensitive files stored on the system, and traced the stealer malware's collection and exfiltration behavior.


Task Answers

QuestionAnswer
Privileged group Administrator belongs toAdministrators
Image field of net command in SysmonC:\Windows\System32\net.exe
First command invoice.pdf.exe executeswhoami
Command malware used to check for MS Defender EDRcmd /c "tasklist /v | findstr MsSense.exe || echo No MS Defender EDR"
Domain malware sent discovered data toexfil.beecz.cafe
Facebook password saved in ChromensAghv51BBav90!
Interesting SSH key stored on diskthm-access-database.key
Secret PDF explaining TryHackMe's internal networkthm-network-diagram-2025.pdf
Directory stealer createsstaging_58f1
Three file extensions malware searches fordocx, pdf, xlsx
PowerShell cmdlet malware uses for clipboardGet-ClipBoard
Domain malware exfiltrates data tocollecteddata-storage-2025.s3.amazonaws.com
Flag using Chrome browserTHM{just_use_web_browser}
Flag using curl.exeTHM{curl_is_cool}
Flag using certutil.exeTHM{abusing_certutil}
Flag using PowerShell IWRTHM{power_of_powershell}

Key Concepts for SOC Work

The process tree is the investigation. In Sysmon, every process has a parent. invoice.pdf.exe → cmd.exe → whoami tells a story that individual events cannot. Building the full process tree from Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Created) is how SOC analysts reconstruct exactly what an attacker did: in sequence, with full command lines.

Attackers use S3 and cloud storage for exfiltration specifically because it blends in. Traffic to amazonaws.com domains is common in most organizations. A stealer exfiltrating to a specific S3 bucket will not look unusual on a firewall log. Detection requires DNS resolution logging (to see the full subdomain) and DLP rules that flag large outbound transfers to cloud storage.


What I Want to Learn Next Based on This

Windows Threat Detection 3 covers persistence: how attackers ensure they maintain access after reboots, which is the final phase before long-term dwell time becomes the real threat.

Originally published on GitHub

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haadi@portfolio: ~

haadi@portfolio:~$ cat meta

  1. category: room notes
  2. path: SOC Level 1
  3. module: Windows security monitoring
  4. topic: 09: Windows Security Monitoring
  5. difficulty: Medium
  6. published: 2026.05.04
  7. read: 3 min

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